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1. SUMMARY 
BRIEFING 
ON 
THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT 
The main institutional subjects related to the European Parliament under discussion at 
the 1996 Intergovernmental Conference are the following: 
- composition; 
- legislative function; 
- budgetary function; 
- political control function; 
- the EP and external action - the CFSP; 
- the EP and the field of home affairs and justice; 
- relations with the national parliaments. 
This briefing will deal with these and other aspects. Please note, however, that some of 
these subjects (namely, the legislative, budgetary and political control functions and 
relations with the national parliaments) are specifically covered by other briefings, and will 
not, therefore, be examined here in detail. 
On the subject of the composition of the European Parliament, the general view so far 
appears to be that the number of MEPs should not exceed 700. There is also a certain 
consensus on the need to reduce the existing imbalance between distribution of seats and 
population, via an across-the-board reduction in the number of seats allocated to each 
Member State accompanied by reservation of a certain number of seats for the smaller 
Member States (although some of the countries concerned reject such a possibility and 
propose continuing the status quo). Some degree of agreement is also visible as regards 
the need to revise the voting s.ystems for the decision-making processes and for certain 
types of majority vote (e.g. a vote of censure against the Commission). 
On the subject of obtaining an extension of the powers of Parliament at the IGC, there is 
a certain degree of agreement (allowing for certain significant exceptions) regarding the 
desirability of extending the codecision procedure, at least to the areas where majority 
voting operates in Council. There are also numerous proposals for the simplification of the 
existing legislative procedures and the reduction of their number to two or three 
(consultation, codecision, assent). 
There are a large number of proposals concerning legislative hierarchy and legislative 
initiative. On the latter subject, it has even been suggested that Parliament should have 
the power of initiative in all the areas where qualified majority voting operates in Council, · 
or, even more radically, on equal terms with the Commission. 
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On the controversial subject of the uniform electoral procedure, it has been proposed that 
once the procedure has been settled the 1999 elections should be held on a regional 
basis. 
On the subject of control, there are still a small number of proposals concerning control 
of the Council by Parliament; a far more frequent demand, however, is for increased 
political power for Parliament to allow it to exercise control over the Commission and the 
other institutions. In this connection, there are proposals for Parliament to have the power 
to reject individual commissioners. In addition, some Member States have specifically 
proposed greater anti-fraud powers for Parliament. 
There is also general agreement that Parliament should have greater powers in the areas 
of the second and third pillars. In both cases, these powers would be linked to an 
extension, or, indeed, generalization of the right of consultation and information: it has 
even been suggested that the right of consultation should, in the context of cooperation 
in the field of justice and home affairs, apply on a prior and mandatory basis. 
On the subject of relations between the EP and the national parliaments, there is a broad 
consensus that links should be established and that the national parliaments should be 
more closely involved in the Union's affairs. 
2. AGENDA FOR THE CONFERENCE 
On the matter of institutional changes affecting Parliament, the agenda for the conferenr.e 
for the revision of the Treaty of Maastricht,·which will largely consist of various documents 
and texts of a legal and political nature, implies certain possible reforms. Article 189b(8) 
of the Trea1lf on European Union provides for revision of the codecision procedure 
involving Parliament and the Council; furthermore, in accordance with the decisions of the 
Brussels European Council {1 0 and 11 December 1993), the IGC will, apart from 
examining the legislative role of Parliament and the other matters provided for in the 
Treaty on European Union, begin considering what measures are necessary to facilitate 
the work of the institutions and ensure their smooth running. The Council meeting of 29 
March 1994 and the loannina Agreement committed the Member States to examining the 
reform of the institutions at the 1996 IGC, and the Corfu European Council (24 and 25 
.June 1994) agreed on the creation of a 'reflection group' to prepare the IGC, with two 
MEPs among its members. The Cannes European Cot 1ncil (26 and 27 .June 1995) set out 
a number of priorities for that group, including the need to increase the efficiency, 
democratic character and transparency of the institutions to enable them to adapt to the 
requirements of an enlarged Union: the group will also be expected to study measures to 
improve the workings of the institutions which do not require amendment of the Treaties 
and can therefore be implemented at once. The European Couo'cil meeting in Madrid on 
15 and 16 December 1995 decided that the Conference should be officially opened in 
Turin on 29 March 1996, in order to create the necessary political and institutional 
conditions for bringing the Union into line with today's realities and tomorrow's 
requirements, particularly with regard to forthcoming enlargement. 
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The European Council received with great interest the Report by the Reflection Group, 
chaired by Mr Westendorp, and decided that the Intergovernmental Conference should 
examine those provisions of the Treaty on European Union, review of which is expressly 
called for in the Treaty, as well as those questions which it was decided should be 
discussed by the Conference, both in the Brussels and Corfu European Council 
Conclusions and in declarations adopted at the time of interinstitutional agreements. The 
European Council also reaffirms the guidelines laid down at its Cannes meeting. The 
Intergovernmental Conference will, in general, have to examine the improvements which 
have to be made to the Treaties to bring the Union into line with today's realities and 
tomorrow's requirements, in the light of the outcome of the Reflection Group's 
proceedings. 
The European Council also agreed that the formal review procedure stipulated in Article 
N of the Treaty would be carried out as quickly as possible so that the Conference can 
be officially opened in Turin on 29 March 1996. 
Finally, the European Council decided that the Conference will meet regularly, in principle 
once a month, at the level of Foreign Affairs Ministers, who will have responsibility for all 
proceedings; preparations will be conducted by a working party made up of a 
representative of each Member States' Minister for Foreign Affairs and of the President 
of the Commission. 
The European Council in Turin on 29 March 1996 opened the Intergovernmental 
Conference and reiterated the already mentioned issues for negotiation. 
The interinstitutional agreements include the interinstitutional declaration on democracy, 
transparency and subsidiarity of 25 October 1993, the interinstitutional agreement of 
29 October 1993 on budgetary discipline and improvement of the budgetary 
procedure, and the 'modus vivendi' on commitology agreed on 20 December 1994 
by the European Parliament, the Council and the Commission. 
3. POSITIONS OF THE MEMBER STATES 
BELGIUM 
Memorandum on the IGC from the Governments of Belgium, Luxembourg and the 
Netherlands, 7 March 1996 
In this memorandum the Benelux countries argue in favour of their traditional pro 
integrationist approach on the process of European integration. In their view this 
process should continue on the basis of close cooperation between states which 
voluntarily share their sovereignty and have, to this end, transferred certain powers 
to the common institutions. 
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On the subject of the European Parliament. the three governments believe that the 
codecision procedure should be simplified and extended to most of the legislative 
fields where qualified majority voting applies. They also favour reducing the 
number of procedures to three (consultation. assent and codecision). 
Concerning the Parliament's role in the second and third pillars of the Union 
(Common Foreign and Security Policy and Justice and Home Affairs). Belgium. 
Luxembourg and the Netherlands are convinced that the Parliament should be 
stronger involved within in the decision-making process on the basis of sufficient 
information provided in due time by the Commission. 
Finally the three governments believe. that the parliament's political powers vis-a-
vis the Commission should be strengthened. In their view, the Commissioners 
should be made more responsible to the Parliament. 
DENMARK 
Open Europe: The 1996 Intergovernmental Conference, Basis for Negotiation, 
11 December 1995 
In this document, the Danish Government states that the European Parliament should 
continue to play a major role in the decision-making process and as a body exercising 
political control. Specifically, the Danish Government could accept an upper limit being 
set for the number of Members of the European Parliament in an enlarged European 
Union. 
In addition, Denmark· is convinced that national parliaments should play a more 
important part. It suggests stepping up the information flow between the Union 
institutions and the national parliaments. Legislative proposals of the Commission 
as well as white and green papers should be forwarded sufficiently early to enable 
national parliaments to adopt their own positions. 
The interest for a stronger role of national parliaments was confirmed by the 
submission of a specific document on this issue in November 1996. 
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GERMANY 
1. Basic positions of the federal government with regard to the 1996 
Intergovernmental Conference 
On 21 February 1995 the Foreign Minister, Klaus Kinkel, set out the underlying philosophy 
behind the federal government's priorities for the 1996 IGC. He took the view that the 
powers of codecision of the European Parliament must be part of the agenda item on 
'increasing efficiency'. Furthermore, the following documents should be mentioned: 
a) Joint declaration of 15 July 1995 by the German and Italian Foreign Ministers 
regarding the 1996 Intergovernmental Conference 
This declaration was made following the meeting in Monte Argentario, Italy, on 15 July 
1995 between the German and Italian Foreign Ministers and includes an undertaking by 
the two countries to cooperate closely in the preparations for the 1996 Intergovernmental 
Conference. It stressed, that full powers of codecision should be granted to the 
European Padiament for all legislative matters. In addition the legislative procedure 
should be simplified and streamlined to make it more transparent and bring it 
closer to citizens. 
In addition, the two governments believe that in the fields of Common Foreign and 
Security Policy and in Justice and Home Affairs the Parliament should be more 
strongly involved, in order to enhance efficiency, coherence and democratic 
legitimacy. 
b) "Germany's objectives for the Intergovernmental Conference", 26 March 1996 
In this brief document the German government again stresses that the Parliament's 
consultative role in Justice and Home Affairs should be enhanced. 
c). Letter from the President of the French Republic, Jacques CHIBAC, and the 
Chancellor of the Federal Republic of Germany, Helmut KOHL, 9 December 1996, 
(See chapter on France) 
II. Basic positions of the German Linder 
The conclusions of the Conference of Ministers of European Affairs of 16 February 
1995 included the following points: · 
- the European Parliament must have an equal right of codecjsjon wjth the Council in 
all EU decisions where the Council decides by majority vote; · 
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- there should be phased implementation of the principle of electoral equality, with the 
allocation of a minimum number of seats for small Member States; 
- there should be a uniform election procedure for all Member States on a regional basis 
for the European Parliament elections in 1999; 
- in anticipation of any future arrangements, the results of the IGC should be 
implemented in cooperation with the European Parliament . 
GREECE 
Greece's posjtjons and comments, Memorandum of the Greek Government, 
24 January 1996 
This document makes clear, that the Greek government is in favour of a 
considerably strengthened European Parliament. First, it is argued, that Its 
legislative role should be enhanced by extending its powers into certain policy 
areas dealt with in the second and the third pillars, alongside with strengthening 
the Commission and the Court of Justice in these areas. 
Second, the codecision-procedure should be simplified and applied to all 
legislative acts (certain exceptions apart), whose adoption requires an absolute 
majority. Greece is willing to accept the extension of qualified majority voting. 
However, for certain sensitive areas including constitutional matters, accession of 
new Member States, and new association agreementS, it believes that the principle 
of unanimity should be retained. 
Third, the government could accept a ceiling of 700 MEPs, provided this did not 
endanger the adequate representation of the smaller Member States. 
Finally, Greece is in favour of strengthening the EP's powers of control over the 
executive bodies. 
SPAIN 
Elements for a Spanish position at the 1996 Intergovernmental Conference, 
28 March 1996 
This document in structure, wording and content is largely based on the 5 
December 1995 report of the Reflection Group, chaired by Carlos Westendorp, who 
later became Spain's Foreign Minister. 
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Concerning institutional reform, Spain believes, that any reform must strengthen 
the single Institutional framework within the Treaty on European Union, 
independent of its structure. 
On the European Parliament Spain would support a ceiling of 700 members, as 
proposed by the Parliament itself. 
Concerning electoral reform, the government ·wishes to read Art. 138(3) of the 
Treaty as requiring an uniform procedure to be introduced in all the Member 
States. It argues in favour of speedy action to this end. 
Regarding the Parliament's legislative role, the government first considers its right 
of initiative and believes it to be sufficient. In addition, the government favours 
reducing the number of legislative procedures to three, namely codecision, assent 
and consultation. Codecision should be simplified and improved without altering 
its general nature, and be extended in scope to the areas currently subject to the 
cooperation procedure. 
On the matter of political control Spain refers to Parliament's role in the 
appointment of the Commission, considering that the existing approval procedure 
under Article 158, applied for the first time for the present Commission, represents 
a satisfactory balance and does not need adaptation. Nevertheless the government 
is in favour of strengthening the Parliament's control powers vis-a-vis the 
Commission by enhancing its role in monitoring the implementation of Community 
acts, and in the field of anti-fraud action. 
In matters of Common Foreign and Security Policr the government believes, that 
the role of the EP can not be the same as in the first pillar. It argues that the 
existing Treaty provisions could be better put into practice. 
Furthermore, Spain is in favour of a general right of consultation of the European 
Parliament in those matters which, for the time being, remain in the third pillar. 
Additionally, it argues that several matters should be referred to the institutional 
framework of the first pillar. in which the Parliament's importance is significantly 
higher. 
Finally it should be noted, that the Spanish government already in March 1995 was 
well aware that the IGC will see a crucial and heated debate on the various aspects 
of strengthening the Parliament's powers (see "The 1996 Intergovernmental 
Conference • Starting-points for a discussion". 2 March 1995"). 
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FRANCE 
Memorandum of France'guidelines for the 1996 IGC, published in "Le Figaro", 
20 February 1996 
In this confidential document the French government takes a rather restrictive 
position concerning the European Parliament. It believes, that the legislative 
procedures should be simplified, but without modifying the existing balance 
between Council and Parliament. It also suggests that an upper limit should be set 
on the number of MEPs at the same time as the project for a uniform electoral 
procedure is put into practice. 
In addition, France strongly demands an enhanced role of the national 
govemments. It favours creating a body, consisting of their representatives, to be 
consulted on all matters relating to respect for the principle of subsidiarity, on the 
grounds that the national parliaments are best equipped to judge on this subject. 
Such a "High Parliamentary Council", which could, for example, comprise two 
representatives from each Member State, could be created by institutionalizing the 
existing COSAC. These ideas were outlined in more detail in a document submitted 
to the IGC in June 1996. 
LeHer from the President of the French Republic, Jacques CHIRAC, and the 
Chancellor of the Federal Republic of German¥, Helmut KOHL, to the Presjdencr 
of the European Council, 9 December 1996 · 
With this joint letter the governments of France and Germany again coordinated 
their negotiation positions as regards the most important issues on the agenda of 
the IGC. 
Concerning the European Parliament the letter states that the present number of 
legislative procedures in which Parliament participates should be reduced, and the 
procedures themselves be simplified. In addition, it should be examined how to 
extend the co-decision procedure to other areas. 
In order to improve the EU' s democratic legitimacy it is also considered to involve 
the national padiaments to a greater extend than hitherto, above all in those areas 
in which national parliaments have up to now played a major role (especially pillar 
II and Ill). A provision to that effect should be included in the revised Treaty. 
Furthermore it is argued that any reform of the decision-making structure in pillar 
m has to safeguard proper consultation of the European Parliament, alongside a 
stronger role for both the Commission and the Court of Justice. As in the case of 
Spain, the transfer of several policy fields to the first pillar is advocated, which 
would also indirectly enhance the position of the European Parliament. 
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IRELAND 
External Challenges and Opportunities. White Paper of the Irish Government on 
Foreign Policv. 26 March 1996 
With this document the Irish govemment makes clear that the democratic character 
of the Union's institutions should be preserved and, where necessary, enhanced. 
It is stated that Ireland will oppose any proposals tending to undermine any of the 
existing institutions in respect of their basic functions under the Treaty. 
Ireland will support: 
• the numerical reduction and simplification of the legislative procedures; 
• the extension of the codecision procedure; 
• greater use of qualified majority voting in the Council. 
The document does also highlight that any strengthening of the role of the national 
parliaments should not affect the position of the European Parliament or lead to 
any further complication of the existing procedures at Union level. 
Finally, in several speeches members of the Irish government declared that Ireland 
would support fixing a maximum number of MEPs. 
ITALY 
Joint declaration of 15 Julv 1995 h¥ the German and Italian Foreign Ministers 
regarding the 19961ntergovernmental Conference 
(See chapter on Germany) 
Position of the Italian government on the IGC for the revision of the Treaties. 18 
March 1996 
In this document the Italian government considers that the IGC should rationalize 
and consolidate the role of the European Parliament. The EP should more fully 
participate in CFSP matters as well as in matters of Justice and Home Affairs. 
Equality between Parliament and Council should be ensured through a hierarchv 
of acts tying the procedure for adopting acts to their status. Within this hierarchy 
of acts ·which Spain did already propose in the Intergovernmental Conference on 
Political Union in 1990/1991 - the number of legislative procedures should be 
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reduced to three. namely assent, consultation and codecision. The assent 
procedure would be extended to include Treaty revisions. Codecision should be 
extended to all legislative measures aimed at establishing a general framework on 
a sectoral and subject-area basis and linked to qualified majority voting in the 
Council of Ministers. Codecision itself should be streamlined via eliminating 
superfluous stages and abolishing the possibility of a third reading in Council in 
the case of disagreement in the Conciliation Committee • 
Finally. Italy is in favour of fixing the maximum number of MEPs between 650 and 
700, and of setting a deadline for the adoption of a European Union wide uniform 
electoral procedure. 
LUXEMBOURG 
Memorandum on the IGC from the Governments of Belgium, Luxembourg and the 
Netherlands. 7 March 1996 
(see chapter on Belgium) 
NETHERLANDS 
Memorandum on the IGC from the Governments of Belgium. Luxembourg and the 
Netherlands, 7 March 1996 
(see chapter on Belgium) 
AUSTRIA 
Guidelines proposed by the Austrian government on the probable subjects of the 
1996 IGC, June 1995 
On the subject of the European Parliament, the Austrian government favours extending 
Parliament's legislative and supervisory powers, and, to this end, advocates discussion 
of simplification of the legislative procedures and of commitology. 
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Certain reservations are expressed concerning the demands (made by Parliament) far. 
Parliament to have the right of initiative vis-a-vis the Commission. Austria nonetheless 
favours reforming the procedure for investing the Commission, and supports the proposal 
made by Mr Santer at the last investiture in January 1995. 
The Austrian government does not see the number of MEPs as being a priority issue: it 
considers that Parliament's efficiency depends on its working methods. 
In the area of the CESP, the Austrian position is that, in the present circumstances, 
parliamentary control in this field should be a matter for the national parliaments. On the 
other hand, it suggests that there is room for enlarging and systematizing the informational 
aspects referred to in Article J.7 of the Treaty on European Union. 
On the subject of cooperation· in the areas of home affairs and justice and the role of the 
European Parliament, the Austrian government's view is similar to that expressed by it on 
the roles of the European Parliament and the national parliaments in the area of the 
CFSP. 
Austria's positions of principle on the Intergovernmental Conference, 26 March 
1996 
With this document Austria makes clear that as regards democracy the existing 
institutional balance should be preserved. It confirms the position that, in order to 
enhance the Union's democratic legitimacy and transparence, legislative 
procedures should be simplified. This should be combined with generally closer 
cooperation between the Council and Parliament as well as with a closer link 
between EP and national parliaments on the basis of COSAC. 
In addition, the government argues in favour of more intensive action against fraud 
and of strengthening the Community institutions, instruments and procedures 
under the third pillar, implying a stronger role of the European Parliament in these 
matters. 
PORTUGAL 
Portugal and the IGC for the revjsjon of the Treaty on European Union, Foreign 
Ministry, March 1996 
On the European Parliament the government feels, that some of the functions 
conferred on it by the Treaty of Maastricht have not yet been sufficiently 
considered or put into practice, and that the revision and adjustment of the existing 
mechanisms should not affect the existing institutional balance. 
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Portugal is in favour of simplifying the codecision procedure and of extending its 
application, especially as regards the areas currently governed by the cooperation 
procedure. In addition, the principle of consultation should be explicitly recognized 
in those first pillar areas, where it remains optional, and reinforced in the fields of 
citizens' rights and interests. 
In the second and third pillars, according to Portugal, improvements are needed to 
• the application of the system of consultation of the European Parliament. 
Concerning the Parliament's powers of control vis-a-vis the Commission the 
govemment believes, that they are sufficient. It is willing however, to consider the 
possibility of having the President of the Commission elected by the European 
parliament from a list of names submitted by the European Council. It opposes, 
however, any formula giving the Parliament the option to dismiss individual 
commissioners. 
Finally, Portugal suggests fixing a maximum number of 700 MEPs. 
FINLAND 
Finland's starting-points and objectives for the 1996 IGC, Repod of the Finnish 
Government to the national Parliament, 27 February 1996 
Rnland' s general approach to European integration in this document is described 
as developing the Union as an association of independent states. 
For the status of the European Parliament that means nevertheless, that the 
government is in favour of strengthening its legislative role, The government points 
out, however, that it would reject all proposals entailing greater powers for the EP 
in the decision-making process concerning modification of the Treaty. 
In addition, Finland is convinced, that the national parliaments should have 
genuine opportunity to influence the Union's actions. The Union institutions should 
work on the basis of openness and maximum efficiency, using procedures which 
facilitate, rather than limit, the national parliament's ability to influence the 
adoption of positions by the Member States. 
The view, that a hierarchy of legislative acts should be created, as proposed by 
Italy, is rejected. Equally, Finland expresses sepsis as regards to a right of initiative 
of the EP. 
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In CFSP maUers the principle of intergovemmental cooperation is highlighted. The 
role of the European Parliament should be clarified on the basis of the existing 
Treaty provisions. 
Finally it is stated that the budgetary procedure should be simplified with the 
introduction of a single stage both in Council and in Parliament. 
Memorandum of the Forejgn.Mjnjstry of 18 September 1995 on the views of the • 
Finnish Government concerning the 1996 Intergovernmental Conference 
The tenor of this earlier document is the same. In addition it makes clear that 
Finland would support limiting the maximum number of MEPs. In this context it 
emphasises that the number of MEPs from smaller Member States should be 
higher than that resulting from the application of any method of calculation based 
exclusively on the population of the various Member States. 
Furthermore some willingness is demonstrated to rethink the role of the European 
Parliament with regard to Justice and Home Affairs. 
SWEDEN 
Government note of 30 November 1995 to the Swedish parliament on the 1996 
Intergovernmental Conference · 
With regard to the European Parliament, the Swedish government states that Sweden 
must act in such a way as to allow the Parliament to continue to play an important role in 
the decision-making processes of the European Union. It supports substantial 
simplification of the many complex procedures whereby Council and Parliament adopt 
decisions, so as to improve their efficiency and ensure that they are better understood by 
Union citizens. 
With regard to the issue of the European Parliament's right of initiative, the Swedish 
government echoes the EP's own request that the Commission should exclusively enjoy 
such a right of initiative. 
With regard to a possible strengthening of the EP's role with regard to financial control, 
the Swedish government believes that this should concern only monitoring and assessing 
such control, but not to decisions affecting the levels or guidelines for such spending. 
After requesting that the role of the national parliaments be reinforced in the decision-
making procedure, the Swedish government refers in particular to decisions adopted 
within the framework of cooperation on justice and home affairs, matters which are of 
major importance for the fundamental rights of citizens and their own individual safety. 
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For this reason, the Swedish government wishes to see the IGC used to examine the 
issue of extending the role of the European Parliament in this field when decisions are 
being adopted. The Government believes that the EP should have wider access to draft 
decisions which are to be binding on the Member States, and in this case it should have 
the option of submitting its own comments within a specific period of time . 
UNITED KINGDOM 
A Partnership of Nations, UK Whjte paper on the IGC, 12 March 1996 
In this document the British government rejects any move towards political union 
leading. according to the UK, to the inexorably transfer of powers to supranational 
institutions, the erosion of national parliaments and the gradual creation of a 
11United States of Europe". It expresses its determination to safeguard the powers 
and responsibilities of the nation states. 
From the British viewpoint, the European Union obtains its democratic legitimacy 
mainly through the national governments and not the European Parliament. 
Accordingly the notion of strengthening the European Parliament in order to reduce 
the democratic deficit of the Union is not shared. National parliaments should 
remain the core element of the Union's democratic legitimacy, especially with 
regard to purely intergovernmental cooperation within the sensible fields of 
common foreign and security policy and home and justice affairs. The European 
Parliament should not get new powers, but strive for greater public support by 
developing its role through the responsible exercise of its existing powers, in 
particular its powers of control over Community spending. 
The European Parliament is blamed for having used its powers in an irresponsible 
manner, in particular with regard to the codecision procedure, which was 
introduced with the Maastricht Treaty. 
It should also be noted that in November 1995 the House of Lords Committee on 
European Affairs published a report on the IGC in which it said that the EP should be 
allowed to make more active use of the powers it already possesses, while opposing any 
extension of those powers (including legislative powers), and explicitly rejecting any 
extension of legislative co-decision. 
4. POSITION OF THE COMMISSION 
In the first part of its report of 1 0 May 1995 on the operation of the Treaty on European 
Union, the Commission, in the context of discussing institutional means of fulfilling the 
criterion of greater legitimacy, makes the following points concerning Parliament: 
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- the Commission notes the significant development of the role of Parliament since the 
Treaty on European Union has been in force, and sets out explicitly the details of 
Parliament's direct political functions and its role in the decision-making process; 
- with respect to the new powers of control conferred by the TEU, the Commission 
points out that Parliament has not to date made use of the new control facility of setting 
up a temporary committee of investigation. It concludes, on the other hand, that the new 
provisions of the TEU reinforcing Parliament's control over the execution of the budget • 
have been implemented without major problems; 
- on the CFSP, the Commission considers that as things stand at present the European 
Parliament's role is already comparable to that of the national parliaments vis-a-vis 
national foreign policy, but recognizes that the implementation of these provisions has 
given rise to interpretative divergences and difficulties. In particular, Parliament feels that 
consultation should precede all important decisions and should be formalized, while the 
Council's view is that its consultation obligations are fulfilled by its President-in-Office 
appearing before the relevant committee of Parliament and by the report annexed to the 
conclusions of the European Council. 
- on cooperation in the areas of justice and home affairs, the Commission identifies 
similar problems of interpretation, but nonetheless feels that the situation is not exactly the 
same, since issues in these fields can have a direct bearing on the fundamental rights of 
persons and civil liberties, and therefore call for greater parliamentary control, especially 
where binding legal instruments are involved; 
- on requests for initiatives, the Commission considers that such requests do not 
constitute a binding obligation on it to submit proposals; it declares, however, that it will 
take full account of them in line with the terms of the recent code of conduct agreed with 
Parliament. 
In conch •sian, the Commission endorses the overall institutional response to the criterion 
of legitimacy contained in the· ·treaty, but nonetheless expresses its reservations 
concerning the weakness, if not actual absence, of democratic control jn the Union jn the 
areas where the intergovernmental approach remains dominant. 
On 6 December 1995 the Commission adopted its official position on the reflection 
group report. It firmly supports all the general ideas in the report and argues that: 
"· the current legislative and administrative decision-making processes need 
radical simplification. There should be no more than three legislative procedures -
codecision in simplified form, which should be the standard procedure, the assent 
procedure and the simple consultation procedure." · · 
Finally, on 3 July 1996 the.Commjssjon report under Article 189b(8} of the Jreatv 
concerning the scope of the codecision-procedure was adopted. This document 
argues that extending the scope of a simplified codecision procedure on a 
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systematic basis would enhance the European Union's democratic legitimacy as 
well as Its efficiency. 
5. POSITION OF THE COUNCIL 
In its report of 6 April1995 on the workings of the Treaty on European Union, the Council 
• considered the question of the Union's institutional system. As far as Parliament is 
concerned, the Council's text makes the following points: 
- the Treaty on European Union has strengthened the role of Parliament in two ways: 
it has reinforced its participation in the legislative process and increased its powers of 
political control. The Council considers, however, that Parliament has at times interpreted 
the powers conferred on it by the treaty in a highly generous fashion; 
- in general terms, the increase in the number of legislative procedures has made the 
decision-making process more complicated. 
With regard to interinstitutional relations, the Council notes that: 
- Parliament has proposed extending the interinstitutional dialogue to new fields 
(application of Title V (CFSP) and Title VI (cooperation in the fields of justice and home 
affairs) of the treaty; EMU; social policy; and transparency), although the Council feels this 
to be unnecessary; 
- Parliament has on occasion sought to use its budgetary powers (which no-one wishes 
to call in question) with a view to influencing the definition of Union policy. 
On the subject of the CFSP, the Council considers that the extent of Parliament's 
involvement in its definition (limited by the TEU to consultation and information) remains 
a bone of contention between the two institutions, and notes that Parliament favours an 
interinstitutional agreement which would introduce new provisions additional to those in 
the treaty. With respect to the financing of the CFSP, the Council's view is that experience 
has shown that there is an imbalance between Parliament's powers of control and its 
budgetary powers, and that Parliament's tendency is to use the latter to increase its 
participation in the CFSP, thus giving rise to numerous conflicts. 
With regard to cooperation in the fields of justice and home affairs, the Council notes that 
here too there is disagreement between it and Parliament over how far Parliament should 
be involved in this area (also limited, by Title VI of the TEU, to consultation and 
information), and that, in this case as well, Parliament has called for an interinstitutional 
agreement which would introduce new provisions additional to those in the treaty. Certain 
Member States have urged that there should be more parliamentary control under Title 
VI; in addition, the question of the financing of the implementation of Title VI raises 
problems similar to those referred to in relation to Parliament and the funding of the CFSP. 
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6. POSITION OF THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT 
Parliaments position is summarized in its resoh •tion of 17 May 1995 on the ftmctioning of 
the Treaty on European llnjon with a view to the 1996 intergovernmental conference -
implementation and development of the llnjon. This resolution makes the following points: 
1. With respect to the CFSP, Parliament considers that democratic control over matters 
not falling under the first pillar should be exercised both by itself and by the national • 
parliaments, and that it should be consulted whenever the Council adopts a common 
position or joint action. It also takes the view that the Council should be obliged to provide 
information on the subjects concerned, and that rules should, accordingly, be drawn up 
for the confidential treatment of such business. 
2. Concerning justice and horne affairs, Parliament considers that the powers of the other 
institutions, its own included, should be reinforced. 
3. With a view to clarifying the various fields of competence, Parliament proposes that 
Article 235 should be retained, but should only be used in the last instance and subject 
to the assent of Parliament. 
4. With the aim of strengthening and democratizing the Union's institutions, and as far as 
Parliament is concerned, the following proposals are made: 
- there should be no more than 700 MEPs, and there should be a common 'MEP's 
statute'; 
Parliament's assent should be required for all appointments of members of the Court 
of Justice, the Court of First Instance, the Court of Auditors and the executive 
committee of the European System of Central banks; 
Parliament should have equal rights to the Council in all the Union's areas of legislative 
and budgetary competence; 
Parliament's role should be strengthened in all the areas where there is insufficient 
Community-level control at present, and in particular in the fields covered by the first 
and second pillars and with regard to EMU; 
Parliament should have, on a par with the other institutions, the following rights: to 
request the opinion of the Court of Justice on the compatibility of international 
agreements with the Treaty; to initiate legal actions (not solely in order to preserve its 
prerogatives); and to be informed of the requests for preliminary rulings forwarded to 
the Court and to submit opinions thereon; 
Parliament should be involved in any decision on its own seat; 
- the Commission should be obliged to respond to Parliament's initiatives under Article 
138b(2). 
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On 17 January 1997, with the Resolution on the general outline for a draft revision 
of the Treaties, the Parliament commented on the general working document, which 
was submitted on 5 December 1998 by the Irish Presidency of the European Council 
in order to summarize the negotiations to date and to provide a comprehensive 
basis for the next phase of negotiations (see below, chapter 110ther Positions"). 
Concerning the role and the powers of the European Parliament this resolution 
states: 
1138. • •. that the Irish Presidency text has made a few positive proposals in this 
regard but, nevertheless, has not adequately taken account of the need to reinforce 
democratic control at EU level: 
(I) the text proposes extension of the codecision-procedure on the basis of 
objective criteria rather· than on a case-by-case basis, but does not draw the 
conclusion that the proposal to extend codecision to the entire area of standard 
secondary legislation as put forward by the Commission and the European 
Parliament is the only proposal on the table and should therefore be followed 
up; 
(ii) the Presidency's text completely fails to tackle the issues of: 
• the extension of the assent procedure to all constitutional issues such as 
reform of the Treaties, Article 235 and own resources, and also to all 
international agreements; 
• the full attainment of budgetary codecision; 
• an enhanced European Parliament role in the appointment of the President and 
Members of the Commission; 
• a reinforced European Parliament role in nominations, with assent as regards 
appointment to the Court of Justice and the Court of Auditors; 
• the reform of the existing complex and insufficiently democratic and transparent 
system of comitology; 
• the responsibilities of the European Parliament in deliberating on and 
evaluating policies; 
39. Welcomes the Presidency's proposal to simplify the codecision procedure, 
which goes in the direction suggested by the European Parliament; considers, 
however, that it should be made clearer that, if the Council makes any changes to 
a text examined by the EP, the latter should always be given a second reading; 
believes, moreover, that the suggested time limits and the other issues such as the 
possible reduction in the size of delegations to the Conciliation Committee or an 
increase in the proportion of permanent members should be discussed jointly by 
the Council and Parliament with the aim of improving the efficiency of the 
conciliation procedure;" 
On 13 March 1997 the Parliament adopted another 11Resolution on the 
Intergovernmental Conference". In this document it: 
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"13. Stresses that citizens demand better democratic legitimation and 
accountability of decisions at European level and hence a simplified, equal right of 
codecision for Parliament must be extended to the entire scope of normal 
Community legislation, while decisions of a fundamental nature and international 
treaties must be subject to Parliament's assent; at all events, Parliament must 
discharge its duties, in term of supervision of the executive, commensurate with 
any representative democratic institution; 
( ... ) 
15. Notes with concem that the concepts discussed hitherto in the Conference do 
not do proper justice to these demands but, on the contrary, in a number of 
important areas involve the risk of weakening democratic legitimation and control 
by Parliament." 
Finally, it should be mentioned that, on the subject of following up the IGC, Parliament 
feels that the guidelines concerning its participation in the negotiations should be defined 
by the interinstitutional conference. Parliament will be required to give its assent on the 
outcome of the negotiations; to this end, it has called for the existing Article N of the Treaty 
to be revised, to ensure that Parliament has the same right as the Commission to submit 
proposals for revising the Treaty. This would necessitate modification of the Treaty to 
ensure that any future revisions are approved jointly by Parliament and the Council before 
being submitted for ratification to the national parliaments. 
7. POSITION OF THE OTHER INSTITUTIONS AND BODIES 
7 .1. OPINION OF THE EUROPEAN COURT OF JUSTICE 
The opinion of the Court of .Justice of Mav 1995 on certain aspects of the implementation 
of the Trea~ on European Union concerns only those aspects affecting the Union's legal 
system. With respect to Parliament, the Court's most interesting comments are the 
following: 
Parliament has already, on. three occasions, used its new power to take out annulment 
proceedings against acts of the Council, under the third paragraph of Article 173 of the 
Treaty; 
- the Court sees no technical reason for opposing the proposals for amending Article 
173 of the Treaty and the related provisions so as to confer on Parliament the right to 
take out annulment proceedings without having to give a specific justification and for 
giving Parliament the official right to request the Court to deliver an opinion on a 
proposed international agreement of the Community, pursuant to Article 228(6) of the 
Treaty. At all events, the Court doubts whether it is desirable to transfer disputes to the 
legal sphere where they could ·be perfectly well resolved in the political sphere by 
political means; 
- the Court supports a longer term of office for its own members rather than the option 
of renewing their terms, but rejects any reform which would involve individual 
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candidates having to be heard b_y the committees of Parliament, on the grounds that 
it is necessary to preserve the criteria of independence and freedom from bias which 
are essential for judicial office; 
The Court of First Instance, in its contribution of 17 May 1995 with a view to the 1996 IGC, 
draws the attention of the conference to a number of points, including the following: 
- any intervention by Parliament in the procedure for appointing judges should only 
concern a judge's first term of office, since Parliament is not in a position to monitor the 
manner in which a judge has carried out his duties; 
- any such intervention by Parliament should have the exclusive objective of determining 
whether the candidates for judicial office fulfil the requisites laid down in the Treaty for 
the exercise of that office. 
7.2. OPINION OF THE COURT OF AUDITORS 
The report submitted by the Court of Auditors to the 'reflection group' on the operation of 
the Treaty on European Union in May 1995 does not contain any specific institutional 
comments on the European Parliament. 
7.3. OPINION OF THE ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL COMMITTEE 
In its report of 26 April 1995 on the IGC and the role of the Economic and Social 
Committee, that institution took the view that the agenda for the IGC should include the 
extension of Parliament's legislative responsibilities via the widening of the codecision 
procedure. Similarly, on the CFSP and cooperation in the field of home affairs and justice, 
the Committee favoured an enhanced role for the EP, even if neither policy is 
'communitarized'. 
7.4. OPINION OF THE COMMITTEE OF THE REGIONS 
In its report on the revision of the Treaty of Maastricht (20 April 1995), the Committee of 
the Regions announced that it would begin work in July 1995 on a report on the conditions 
for a positive dynamic in relation to the EP and the other institutions. It further proposed 
that its own consultative role should be enhanced, and that the obligation to consult it 
should also apply to Parliament; and, in addition, that where there is a disagreement with 
the Committee of the Regions, the institution concerned should inform the committee of 
the reasons for its position . 
-23- PE 166.741 
8. OTHER POSITIONS 
8.1. REFLECTION GROUP'S REPORT OF 5 DECEMBER 1995 
The European Parliament 
(a) Composition 
It seems appropriate to fix a maximum number of seats. A majority accept a maximum 
of 700 in an enlarged Union, as the European Parliament itself proposes in its report. It 
has also been suggested by some members that there should be at least enough 
mem~rs to ensure that major political forces of each Member State have the possibility 
to be represented. 
(b) Uniform electoral procedure 
It has been recalled by the Group that Article 138(3) provides for the establishment of 
such a procedure in all Member States. Some members propose that this legal basis 
should be changed to help achieve this objective and that a final date be established for 
its application. Others do not consider such amendments necessary. 
(c) Legislation 
The EP's legislative initiative· 
The Group considers that the right of request established in Article 138b is broadly 
sufficient. Some members nevertheless point out that this Article should require the 
Commission to reply to the European Parliament's request. 
Legislative procedures: 
The Group is in favour of reducing the variety of procedures currently in force under the 
Treaty, and a large majority proposes its reduction to three: co-decision, assent and 
consultation. Some members note that this should not imply a change of the present 
institutional balance. 
Some members propose that assent should be applied where the Council decides with 
unanimity, specially in Treaty changes (article N), own resources, article 235 and Third 
Countries' agreements. 
The Group feels it is appropriate to improve and simplify the codecision procedure 
without changing its nature. A large majority is in favour of extending it. Most would 
extend it to all legislation adopted by the Council by qualified majority. Another view focus 
extension to the matters currently dealt with by the cooperation procedure, whereas others 
suggest a case by case approach. 
One member, in principle, opposes any extension. 
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(d) Budgetary function 
In addition to the fairly general wish to simplify the procedure (abolition of one of the 
readings), the proposal made by some members to reduce the lack of consistency 
between the EP's budget powers with regard to expenditure and those with regard to 
revenue has already been mentioned. In the case of expenditure, some members 
propose simplifying the procedure by removing the distinction between compulsory and 
non-compulsory expenditure. Most members, are, however, against removing the 
CE/NC distinction. Some suggest an intermediate approach for improving the balance of 
budget powers between the Council and the Parliament which would involve giving the 
latter some latitude to intervene in CE, perhaps in the form of a percentage. 
(e) Political control 
As regards the role of the EP in the appointment of the of the Commission, several 
members see that the current approval procedure of Article 158, applied for the first time 
to the present Commission, represents a satisfactory balance that should not be changed. 
Others would prefer the EP to elect the President of the Commission from a list proposed 
by the European Council. A majority in the Group favours making the Commission more 
accountable to the European Parliament. Some members propose the possibility of 
individual motions of censure of Commission members by the Parliament, but others 
object to this on the grounds that such a possibility would undermine the collegiate nature 
of the Commission. Some members advocate establishing procedures to improve the 
accountability of the Commission to the Council. 
(f) Executive control 
A distinction should be made here between executive powers exercised by the 
Commission and those exercised by the Member States in implementation of Community 
law. Most members consider it appropriate to increase the EP's and the Ombudsman's 
powers in combatting fraud and, in general, in monitoring the executive powers of the 
institutions. 
(g) Role of the EP in the sphere of CFS 
The majority consider that the role of the European Parliament cannot be the same in 
this area as in Community legislation, since national parliaments do not use the same 
mechanisms of participation in framing and monitoring foreign policy as in their legislative 
work or in domestic control. However, some members think that the present Treaty 
provisions should be better developed in practice, centring on the European Parliament's 
right to be informed in this respect. Others think it necessary to go further and involve 
Parliament more closely in determining the broad lines of'the CFS and in controlling the 
Union's external political affairs by means of arrangements in the Treaty ensuring 
confidentiality. · 
Several members point out that the EP should not under any circumstances be given 
powers in this area in which governments conduct their foreign policy without prior 
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authorization from Parliament, except in cases of extreme gravity. At least one member 
is against any increase in Parliament' role in this sphere. 
(h) Justice and home affairs 
For the large majority, the Conference should improve the objectives and the instruments 
in this area of the Treaty. Many members favour a pragmatic approach in order to identify 
where there is need of further use of common institution s and criteria (Commission's non-
exdusive right of initiative, control by the European Parliament and the Court of Justice, 
use of the majority rule in some instances, without prejudice to the appropriate use of 
unanimity in particularly sensitive areas) and where the full use of Community competence 
is required. 
The Group agrees that the national parliaments and the European Institutions should 
intensify their relations on justice and home affairs. It has been suggested in this 
connection that COLAC or an ad hoc interparliamentary commission could facilitate the 
exchange of parliamentary information on the subject. The idea of a High Consultative 
Council made up of two representatives of each of the national parliamentary was also 
presented as having a special value for this area. 
8.2. IRISH PRESIDENCY OF THE EUROPEAN COUNCIL: THE EUROPEAN UNION 
TODAY AND TOMORROW. ADAPTING THE EUROPEAN UNION FOR THE BENEFIT 
OF ITS PEOPLES AND PREPARING IT FOR THE FUTURE. A GENERAL OUTLINE 
FOR A DRAFT REVISION OF THE TREATIES. BRUSSELS, 5 DECEMBER 1996 
This document states: 
"A strong European Parliament is an essential part of a democratic Union. The 
European Parliament's powers therefore need to be consolidated as regards both 
its political and legislative action." 
The text goes on, first, to put foiWard a draft Treaty text which would strengthen the 
political role of the EP by providing that it must approve the nomination of the 
President of the Commission. 
Furthermore, in order to enhance the EP' s role as "co-legislator'', the Presidency 
proposes to reduce the number of legislative procedure to three, namely 
codecision, consultation and assent, and that the assent procedure should be 
limited to accession and association agreements. Cooperation procedure should 
only be applied with regard to EMU. 
In addition, the extension of the scope of the codecision procedure on a systematic 
basis, rather than on a case-by-case basis, is advocated, as well as a streamlining 
of the codecision procedure itself. 
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Finally, it is stated that the introduction of a uniform electoral procedure for 
elections to the EP remains under discussion at the Conference. However. no 
Treaty amendment is identified. 
* * * * * 
For further information related to this briefing, please contact: 
Mr J. Javier FERNANDEZ FERNANDEZ, Task Force Coordinator, Division for Political 
and Institutional Affairs (DG IV) I Mr Andreas LAUTZ 
Tel.: 2758 (Luxembourg), 4916 (Strasbourg) 
Fax: 4300-9027 (Luxembourg), 88174840 (Strasbourg) 
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